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Abstract
This paper constructs a model of metaphysical indeterminacy that can accommodate 
a kind of ‘deep’ worldly indeterminacy that arguably arises in quantum mechanics 
via the Kochen–Specker theorem, and that is incompatible with prominent theories 
of metaphysical indeterminacy such as that in Barnes and Williams (Oxf Stud Meta-
phys 6:103–148, 2011). We construct a variant of Barnes and Williams’s theory that 
avoids this problem. Our version builds on situation semantics and uses incomplete, 
local situations rather than possible worlds to build a model. We evaluate the result-
ing theory and contrast it with similar alternatives, concluding that our model suc-
cessfully captures deep indeterminacy.
Keywords Metaphysical indeterminacy · Deep indeterminacy · Kochen–Specker · 
Situation semantics · Indeterminacy
1 Introduction
This paper presents a model of metaphysical indeterminacy. It attempts to provide a 
structure that captures the sort of ‘deep’ metaphysical indeterminacy which causes 
problems for a number of existing theories. Our core idea is this: metaphysical inde-
terminacy is a matter of reality being unsettled between parts which fundamentally 
disagree about how the world is.
Providing models for metaphysical indeterminacy is a flourishing industry (see, 
e.g. Akiba 2004; Barnes and Williams 2011; Wilson 2013; Torza 2017; Calosi 
and Wilson 2018). The motivation is to provide a systematic account of how meta-
physical indeterminacy should be theorised. This is valuable because to investigate 
metaphysical indeterminacy and its applications thoroughly, we should first be clear 
about how to understand it. Even the sceptic about the existence or coherence of 
metaphysical indeterminacy should welcome such clarity.
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Several such theories of metaphysical indeterminacy (Akiba 2004; Barnes 
and Williams 2011, for example) share a common feature—they presuppose that 
although reality is not precise, it could be. Metaphysical indeterminacy is then 
explained as unsettledness between different precise candidates for how reality is. 
Quantum indeterminacy is especially interesting in this regard (Darby 2010; Skow 
2010), because although it is one of the main naturalistic motivations for a theory of 
metaphysical indeterminacy, the reason that it is a popular example of genuine meta-
physical indeterminacy is that quantum reality simply cannot be precisified all at 
once—the Kochen–Specker theorem appears to show that assigning precise values 
to all observables is mathematically impossible (given non-commutative algebras of 
observables). Thus the theories of metaphysical indeterminacy that require complete 
precisifications of reality are undermined.
We present what we consider an obvious solution: to work with a view accord-
ing to which precisifications are local rather than global. Kochen–Specker rules 
out assigning precise values to all observables, so a natural fix is for a theory of 
metaphysical indeterminacy to assign precise values to only some observables in 
this context. The move parallels the thought that although the metaphysics litera-
ture makes great use of possible worlds, which are essentially complete or maximal, 
there are many purposes, among which is this one, for which less-than-maximal 
possibilities are theoretically important. This idea can be cashed out in various ways, 
notably in situation semantics, which uses parts of possible worlds (situations) as the 
basis of meaning. Situations are thereby inherently partial (Kratzer 1989), and vari-
ous theoretical advantages are claimed including accounts of anaphora (Elbourne 
2005), definite descriptions (Elbourne 2013) and the liar paradox (Barwise and 
Etchemendy 1987).1
Our approach will be to take incompatible situations as our candidate precisifica-
tions between which reality is unsettled. We explore how these devices are naturally 
given a metaphysical reading in the style of Barnes and Williams (2011). In doing 
so, we propose an account of metaphysical indeterminacy which neatly aligns with 
quantum mechanical motivations for understanding reality as unsettled.
Our paper will be structured as follows: first we shall give some brief background 
on existing accounts of metaphysical indeterminacy. We will then explain the dis-
tinctive challenge of ‘deep’ indeterminacy (in the quantum case and in general). Our 
fourth section introduces our model in some detail. In our fifth section we evaluate 
the model, especially with respect to some nearby alternatives we have chosen not to 
pursue, before concluding.
2  Meta‑level accounts and the Barnes–Williams model
To present our alternative, we should first give a brief recap on the state of play.
1 Situations are also used by Edgington (1985) in the context of Fitch’s Paradox and Rumfitt (2015 and 
elsewhere) in the context of logical consequence, to give further examples.
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What is indeterminacy? One helpful way to think of it is as an irremovable sort 
of unsettledness. It has a number of different species. A paradigm understanding of 
indeterminacy is found in the vagueness literature in the philosophy of language: it 
is indeterminate whether some stones make a heap. This kind of indeterminacy is 
naturally thought of as representational: it is not ‘out there in the world’, rather there 
is just no fact of the matter about whether those stones fall under the meaning of the 
word ‘heap’. The indeterminacy involved in these vagueness cases is therefore natu-
rally interpreted as semantic.
Metaphysical indeterminacy is indeterminacy of a different sort. The intuitive 
idea of metaphysical indeterminacy is that it is non-representational indeterminacy. 
This requires elaboration. The core notion is that metaphysical indeterminacy is 
indeterminacy that is really ‘out there in the world’. If semantic indeterminacy is a 
result of some sort of deficiency in language, and epistemic indeterminacy is a result 
of deficiency in knowers, metaphysical indeterminacy in a result of deficiency in 
how things are. Along these lines, Barnes (2010) takes metaphysical indeterminacy 
to be that indeterminacy that would remain even if the all the representational inde-
terminacy were removed—that is, if all other sources of deficiency were taken away.
Saying what metaphysical indeterminacy is supposed to be is obviously also rele-
vant to whether there is, or could be, any. This issue is contentious: it is by no means 
universally accepted that the notion of metaphysical indeterminacy is coherent. Nor 
is it universally accepted that metaphysical indeterminacy is possible. One indirect 
way to argue for the coherence and possibility of such indeterminacy is to con-
struct explicit models of it; providing precise accounts of a purported phenomenon 
can make that phenomenon seem more respectable. Examples of models of meta-
physical indeterminacy include Akiba (2004), Barnes and Williams (2011), Wilson 
(2013) and Torza (2017). Here we focus on a particular class of models which treat 
metaphysical indeterminacy in a way akin to linguistic indeterminacy. In a case of 
linguistic indeterminacy, language could be more precise, but is not. Indeterminacy 
arises when something is true on some precisifications of the language and false on 
others. In a parallel way, these models take it that the world itself could be more pre-
cise, but is not. Metaphysical indeterminacy then arises when something is true on 
some precisifications of the world and not on others. This class of models are called 
‘meta-level’ accounts by Wilson (contrasting with her own ‘object-level’ view).
The main idea in Barnes and Williams (2011) (‘BW’) is that we should treat 
metaphysical indeterminacy in much the same way as the supervaluationist treats 
cases of vagueness: namely by considering different candidate precisifications and 
regarding something as indeterminate when the different precisifications disagree 
about that thing. To be more specific, BW propose a model whereby there are differ-
ent candidate precisifications of actuality. These precisifications are ersatz possible 
worlds, and to be a candidate for representing actuality is to not determinately fail 
to represent actuality. So the ersatz worlds are representations of reality, and some 
group of them are distinctive by being those which do not determinately represent 
actuality inaccurately. These worlds, which are complete and precise, are the mecha-
nism by which to express indeterminacy. It is determinate that p iff all of the ersatz 
worlds that are candidates for representing actuality are p-worlds, determinate that 
¬p iff none of these worlds are p-worlds, and indeterminate whether p iff some but 
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not all of these worlds are p-worlds. So, formally speaking, we evaluate propositions 
not at a specific (maximal, sharply defined) world, but rather evaluate them on sets 
of worlds. If there is no metaphysical indeterminacy, only one candidate will not 
determinately misrepresent reality, and so the model will collapse into the familiar 
framework.
(Because they use ‘not determinately failing to represent actuality’ as the condi-
tion for being a member of the set of precifications, the Barnes–Williams model 
is not reductive in an important sense. But our main focus here—the source of the 
trouble with deep indeterminacy and the reason for the move from worlds to situa-
tions—is on the structural features of the model rather than its reductive ambitions.)
BW add to this structure the claim that “there is the One True actualized world—
it is just indeterminate which world this is” (p. 131). This can be a little hard to 
parse, but we understand it to mean that there really is exactly one ersatz world 
which correctly represents actuality, but it is indeterminate which one it is.
A feature of the BW model is that it can uphold classical logic (BW point to this 
as a benefit). In particular, both bivalence and excluded middle are retained. They 
have bivalence because every possible world which is a candidate is bivalent: for 
any proposition p either p is true in a world or p is false in that world. Given that 
these are the candidates for actuality, and that one of them is in fact the One True 
world, bivalence holds. The theory retains the principle of excluded middle because 
for any proposition p, (p ∨ ¬p) is true at all worlds, so determinately true.
On the BW approach, indeterminacy has an interesting parallel with modality. 
Something is necessary when true in all possible worlds and contingent when true 
in some but not all possible worlds. Similarly, on the BW model, something is deter-
minate when true in all the possible worlds in a restricted range and indeterminate 
when true in some but not all of the possible worlds in that range. The relevant pos-
sible worlds are those which do not determinately fail to represent actuality. As a 
consequence, a disjunction might be determinate while its disjuncts are indetermi-
nate, in the same way that a disjunction can be necessary while its disjuncts are con-
tingent. For instance, ‘the university is in the city centre’ and ‘the university is in the 
suburbs’ may both be indeterminate while ‘the university is either in the city centre 
or in the suburbs’ is determinately true.
The modal comparison will be significant later when we consider the needed 
modification to cope with deep indeterminacy—the modification is analogous to 
treatments of modal logic using less-than-maximal possibilities instead of the more 
familiar possible worlds. But first, we shall set out the issue arising for the BW 
model from deep indeterminacy.
3  The challenge of deep indeterminacy
As has been mentioned above, quantum mechanics is often cited as an example 
of metaphysical indeterminacy, or indeed as a motivation for developing a theory 
of such indeterminacy. Many more recent interpretations of quantum mechanics, 
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however, don’t obviously seem to generate a case for such indeterminacy.2 Never-
theless, and without going into the interpretative assumptions that are required to 
underwrite a move from quantum mechanics to worldly indeterminacy, it is com-
monly claimed that that there is at least motivation from physics for seeking an 
account of metaphysical indeterminacy (see, for instance, Williams 2008; Wilson 
2013; and Bokulich 2014).
Although we think it can be doubted that quantum mechanics gives us motivation 
to seek a model of metaphysical indeterminacy, what we are interested in here is a 
different sort of problem. The problem is the following: many of those who present 
quantum mechanics as a motivation for accepting genuinely metaphysical indeter-
minacy provide models which aren’t able to capture precisely the quantum mechani-
cal phenomena they point to as a motivation. Following Skow, we’ll focus on the 
Barnes–Williams model, but this issue plausibly arises for others too. The issue 
for BW is that the candidates for actuality in their model, the candidates between 
which reality is unsettled, are ersatz possible worlds. But worlds are maximal; being 
a possible world involves settling everything. In particular, every observable gets a 
value in a possible world. But the essence of the Kochen–Specker result is that it is 
impossible for every observable to have a value at once. It doesn’t even make sense 
within the mathematical constraints of the formalism to claim that every observable 
gets a value in the relevant contexts. Thus this kind of ‘deep’ indeterminacy cannot 
be modelled by the Barnes–Williams framework because the tools they use for the 
modelling are complete and precise.
But what exactly is ‘deep’ metaphysical indeterminacy? Skow uses the term to 
refer to “metaphysical indeterminacy [which] runs so deep (or can run so deep) that 
reality cannot be completely precisified.” (Skow 2010, p. 852, italics in original) The 
quantum mechanical case is therefore an alleged instance of this sort of metaphysi-
cal indeterminacy. Deep metaphysical indeterminacy is thus the sort of indetermi-
nacy which resists complete precisifications, even into alternatives. It renders reality 
by nature incomplete.
A related notion of deep indeterminacy is also worth mentioning. This takes deep 
metaphysical indeterminacy to be indeterminacy which is prescribed by the nature 
of the domain under discussion. It is part of the theoretical set-up that there is inde-
terminacy involved; indeterminacy is not an optional extra. In other words, any rep-
resentation of the domain which is not indeterminate cannot be an accurate repre-
sentation of how the domain could be: to fail to be indeterminate is to determinately 
2 For example, in the modern Everett interpretation the underlying ontology, from which the branches 
emerge, is perfectly determinate (whether the branches themselves are is another matter, but the underly-
ing ontology is the level at which one would naturally judge the question of whether there is metaphysi-
cal indeterminacy). In the modern ‘flashy’ GRW theory, the distribution of flashes in spacetime is also 
perfectly determinate. If one subscribes to the view that, one way or another, what is fundamental is the 
wave function evolving in configuration space then yet again the fundamental ontology is perfectly deter-
minate. Perhaps there is a sense in which derivative ontology that does include indeterminacy still falls 
under what is intended by ‘metaphysical indeterminacy’, but this is much less clear. See Glick (2017) for 
discussion: he is sceptical that there is a motivation to be found here.
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fail to represent the relevant actuality.3 The quantum mechanical example is also an 
alleged case of this more general view of deep indeterminacy.
The key point is that, in both senses, deep metaphysical indeterminacy cannot be 
modelled as unsettledness between complete, precise alternatives: these alternatives 
cannot be complete and precise if they are really to be alternatives for how things in 
fact are. So, independent of the precise quantum mechanical motivations for seeking 
a theory of metaphysical indeterminacy, we think it worth providing an account of 
metaphysical indeterminacy which allows for its deep variety.
The response we’ll pursue is to show how one can model deep indeterminacy by 
adjusting the BW framework in ways that we take to be independently plausible. 
Before we spell out the model, however, we should briefly note a dialectical point 
given our bracketing of various other potential responses to the issues arising from 
the Kochen–Specker result.
We don’t wish to follow Skow in claiming that the Kochen–Specker result shows 
that deep indeterminacy is clearly possible, exactly, but just that it is at least impor-
tant to explore how theories of metaphysical indeterminacy should handle it. There 
are coherent interpretative assumptions which would render quantum mechanics a 
case of deep indeterminacy. Even if the best interpretation of quantum mechanics 
does not turn out to warrant these assumptions, now that we’ve become aware of 
the possibility of deep indeterminacy it worth investigating how the Barnes–Wil-
liams model can be revised to account for it, given that it is at present incapable of 
doing so. Deep metaphysical indeterminacy sounds, on the surface at least, like it 
should be possible if the very idea of metaphysical indeterminacy is, and so should 
be accounted for by an acceptable theory.
4  Modelling deep indeterminacy
4.1  Situations and indeterminacy
Our solution to the problem of deep indeterminacy will involve using different theo-
retical machinery. We will use situations to model metaphysical indeterminacy in 
a way that makes space for deep indeterminacy.4 As a first gloss, situations can be 
introduced as parts of possible worlds. This is only a gloss, though, as a thorough-
going situation theorist will prefer to take situations as the theoretical primitive and 
then (if necessary) define possible worlds as special sorts of situation. How, exactly, 
4 What follows uses the formal machinery of situation semantics. There are other semantics akin to 
situation semantics which might be conducive to a similar approach. In particular, Fine’s Truthmaker 
Semantics (Fine 2017) might be a fruitful alternative way to express the metaphysical claims here 
advanced (see also Yablo 2014 for discussion of ‘aboutness’). What will be crucial is the partial nature of 
the entities under consideration and the denial of monotonicity that occurs below relating to persistence.
3 This notion can be applied more generally. As an example, we, along with Jon Robson as a co-author, 
discuss deep indeterminacy of this sort in the context of fictional indeterminacy in Darby, Pickup and 
Robson (2017).
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to fully characterise situations isn’t a settled issue in situation theory.5 Nevertheless, 
whatever they are, situations are paradigmatically partial: they do not have to tell us 
everything.6 For instance, the situation encompassing only World War 2 does not 
give us any information about World War 1, or future Martian settlers, or events 
happening on a distant planet in 1945. To put it another way, situations will give 
answers to some, but not all, questions (whereas worlds give an answer to every 
question). Situation semantics proposes that we evaluate propositions with respect to 
situations rather than worlds. While possible world semantics offers possible worlds 
as the entities with respect to which propositions are evaluated, situation semanti-
cists simply replace these maximal worlds with partial situations.
There are several advantages to evaluating with respect to situations rather than 
worlds.7 But we do not wish to be committed to situation semantics per se. Rather, 
we want to see what metaphysical work the tools of situation theory can do in the 
present context. Given this purpose, we will only introduce what machinery is nec-
essary to do this work. Specifically, although there are a variety of ways to flesh 
out a situation theory and corresponding semantics, we will only fill in the picture 
where it is required for presenting our model.
The proposition expressed by a typical statement like ‘Jane is swimming’ will 
be evaluated with respect to some particular situation: following Austin we take the 
statement to give both a claim and a specific situation with respect to which we can 
evaluate the claim.8 The proposition is true if Jane is swimming in the relevant situa-
tion. The proposition is false if Jane is, say, running in the relevant situation. But not 
all situations of evaluation will settle the question of whether Jane is swimming: sit-
uations that don’t contain Jane, for instance, will not say whether she is swimming. 
There is a situation-theoretic choice to make about the truth-value of the proposition 
in such situations. One alternative is to take the proposition to be false with respect 
to situations which don’t address the claim that is made. The other is to take the 
proposition to be neither true nor false. We favour the latter view, and this will be 
important for our model.
Why believe that a proposition is neither true nor false when the situation of eval-
uation doesn’t settle the issue? Without going into too much detail, there are a few 
indicative reasons. One is that situations, being partial, just don’t tell us everything. 
If we take proposition to be false in  situations which don’t settle the question of 
Jane’s swimming, we wouldn’t be able to distinguish by truth-value situations which 
5 Barwise (1988) lists a series of choice points for the nature of situations and their behaviour.
6 One might define possible worlds as special sorts of situation that are maximal in some sense. Such 
situations would not be partial in that sense. There might also be an unrestrictedly maximal situation that 
described everything that is possible (akin to the Lewisian pluriverse): this would not be partial in any 
sense. Whether there are possible worlds or a maximal element are open questions in situation theory, 
but the point here is simply that situations do not need to be maximal in any sense.
7 Kratzer (2017) describes some areas within semantics where situations have been used productively, 
including anaphora and the Liar paradox.
8 Broadly speaking, the claim is given by the ‘type’ of the statement, while the situation of evaluation is 
given by the particular ‘stating’ in context. In Austin (1950), which is a foundational text for this seman-
tic approach, these are provided by two sets of conventions, the descriptive and the demonstrative respec-
tively.
 Synthese
1 3
show Jane is not swimming from those which are simply silent on the issue. Fur-
thermore, if propositions are false in situations which don’t settle the relevant ques-
tion then incompatible statements like ‘Jane is in motion’ and ‘Jane is at rest’ will 
receive the same truth-value (namely ‘false’) in situations which, for instance, just 
don’t contain Jane.9
This gives some motivation for the idea that propositions can lack truth values 
in situations. The example we have been using is a proposition about Jane’s activ-
ity being evaluated with respect to a situation in which she is not present. More 
generally, propositions about individuals will typically be neither true nor false 
in situations which lack them. (This won’t be the case for propositions asserting the 
existence of an individual, which will be false in situations lacking those individu-
als).10 This is not the only way to get a truth-value gap, however. Situations are fine-
grained, so that a situation which contains an individual need not contain all the 
predicates true of that individual. For instance, a situation in which Jane is swim-
ming might not include the fact that Jane is thinking about her dinner plans. The 
proposition ‘Jane is thinking about dinner’ can therefore still come out as neither 
true nor false when evaluated with respect to a situation containing Jane, if that situ-
ation is appropriately restricted.
Propositions lacking truth-values in cases like this might be broadly described as 
those which are not about the situation (or, to put it the other way around, such situa-
tions underdetermine the propositions). This accords well with the spirit of situation 
theory: the fact that situations are partial is in sympathy with the view that situations 
don’t give a truth-value for every proposition. However, we will require truth-value 
9 There are ways to avoid this. One option is to restrict to atomic propositions: only atomic propositions 
which are not settled by a situation are false in that situation. If ‘at rest’ is defined as ‘not in motion’ and 
if ‘Jane is not in motion’ is equivalent to ‘it is not the case that Jane is in motion’, then ‘Jane is at rest’ 
will be the negation of ‘Jane is in motion’. The atomic ‘Jane is in motion’ will be false and so its nega-
tion, ‘Jane is at rest’, will be true. This is sort of move invokes negative free logic.
 There are reasons we are wary of this in the context of situation semantics. One is that it appears to 
rule out atomic propositions being incompatible. Though this is contentious, ‘The apple is red’ and ‘The 
apple is green’ appear to both be atomic and to be incompatible. Secondly, the equivalence of ‘Jane is not 
in motion’ and ‘it is not the case that Jane is in motion’ might be challenged in circumstances where Jane 
does not exist.
 At any rate, these considerations were only supposed to be indicative of motives for taking some propo-
sitions to be neither true nor false: we are not wedded to them. Nor are we claiming that there is no plau-
sible account on which a proposition is false when the situation doesn’t speak to the proposition. (Thanks 
to a reviewer for prompting reflection on this.).
10 Why will it be false? Because such propositions assert of an individual that it exists, when there is no 
such individual in the relevant situations of evaluation.
 A typical semantics will make an existential quantification of the form ‘a exists’ true when and only 
when there is an admissible value of x which can be substituted into the formula x = a to give a true 
identity. What is an admissible value will depend on context: for situation theory a natural domain for 
possible values of x is the individuals in the situation of evaluation. A situation in which a doesn’t exist 
will therefore not have an admissible value of x which can make x = a true. The statement ‘a exists’ 
will therefore be false in such situations. See the Appendix to Pickup (2016) for a sketch of an example 
semantics.
 Thanks to one reviewer for spotting that existential statements will be atypical in this way, and to both 
reviewers for prompting the more general discussion here.
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gaps in further cases as well. In particular, we’ll claim propositions can be neither 
true nor false when situations overdetermine propositions. This will become clearer 
when put into practice, but the motivating idea is that certain situations fail to settle 
certain propositions when they are conflicted about those propositions.11 We grant 
that cases like this might appear odd. Rather than defend them in the abstract, we 
hope that presenting the overall picture will be reassuring about the overall consist-
ency of the model we present (even if it doesn’t yet fully convince).
Our situation semantics, therefore, will allow propositions to lack truth-values, 
and in different ways. Two further, and uncontroversial, aspects of situation theory 
can be added. Firstly, that situations can be parts of one another (i.e. there are mere-
ological relations between situations), and secondly that the evaluation of truth-val-
ues is situation-relative. This provides a relation between situations and a situation-
theoretic account of truth. Having given the basic components of situation theory, 
we can formulate our preferred model of metaphysical indeterminacy.
4.2  The model
As noted, the trouble with the BW model is that it requires complete precisifications 
(in the form of entire possible worlds) as the candidates between which the world is 
not settled. In short, as mentioned above, situations can be used as precisifications 
of incomplete things. According to us, therefore, determinacy is a matter of truth in 
situations which are candidates for actuality.
To be explicit: we propose to replace the original BW structure with a new struc-
ture. BW evaluate propositions with respect to sets of ersatz possible worlds. These 
possible worlds are the candidate precisifications of reality. For BW, it is indeter-
minate whether p iff some of the ersatz worlds that are candidates for representing 
actuality are p-worlds, and some are ¬p-worlds. It is determinate that p iff all these 
worlds are p-worlds. To be a candidate for representing actuality is to not determi-
nately fail to represent actuality. Our structure evaluates propositions with respect to 
sets of (sharply defined but typically local and incomplete) situations. These situa-
tions are the candidate precisifications of parts of reality. A first pass at a situation-
theoretic version of BW might be:
Determinacy  A proposition p is determinate iff it is true in every situation 
which is a candidate for representing reality
Indeterminacy  A proposition p is indeterminate iff it is true in some but not all 
situations which are candidates for representing reality
11 Deep indeterminacy, we’ll claim, can be modelled as an instance of this. Kit Fine’s Fragmentalism 
(2005) can also be interpreted in a cognate way, as generating conflicting fragments (= situations?) from 
the reality of tense. On one interpretation of Fine’s view, different times will give different truth-values 
for propositions, leading to truth-value gaps in the ‘über-reality’ which contains multiple times. Other 
applications of this overdetermination approach include puzzles about the persistence of material objects 
(see Pickup 2016 for an application to the Ship of Theseus case).
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But this isn’t quite right. For situations are partial, and will not contain all deter-
minately true propositions. For instance, suppose it is determinate that a ball has a 
certain mass. The proposition expressing this will not be true in all situations which 
might represent reality, for many of these will simply not contain the ball. This is 
where our choice in the previous section to allow propositions to lack truth-values 
in  situations starts to make a difference. For in  situations which lack the ball, the 
proposition that it has a certain mass will be neither true nor false. Whereas a case 
of indeterminacy is a case where the different candidates will genuinely disagree 
about how reality is, i.e. the relevant proposition will be true in some situation and 
false in others. We can therefore offer the following definitions on our model:
Determinacy  A proposition p is determinate iff it is true in some situation 
which is a candidate for representing reality and false in no 
such situation
Indeterminacy  A proposition p is indeterminate iff it is true in some situation 
which is a candidate for representing reality and false in some 
other such situation
This captures the fact that indeterminacy isn’t a matter simply of incompleteness, 
but rather of disagreement.
To see how this works in practice, we will take a determinate case, a typical 
case of indeterminacy and a case of deep indeterminacy and show how the defini-
tions apply.
Let’s assume it is determinate that a particular ball has mass M. How does this 
fit the model? There will be a number of different situations which fail to deter-
minately misrepresent reality: this is our set of situations with respect to which 
we evaluate. Some of these will contain the ball with its mass, and some will not. 
The situations lacking the (whole) ball and its mass will give no truth-value to the 
proposition expressing the claim that the ball has mass M: it will be neither true 
nor false in these situations. The situations containing the (whole) ball will be 
ones in which it has mass M, and so the relevant proposition will be true in them. 
This exhausts the situations in the evaluative set. Thus the proposition will be 
determinate: it is true in at least one situation which is a candidate for represent-
ing reality and false in no other such situation.
Next, suppose it is (metaphysically) indeterminate whether Jones has some 
property F. Within the set of situations which don’t determinately misrepresent 
reality we will find many which say nothing about Jones’s F-ness. In these, the 
proposition expressing that Jones is F will be neither true nor false. As it is inde-
terminate whether Jones indeed is F, the remaining situations in the set will be of 
two types. In some, Jones will be F. In others, Jones will be not F. Thus, in some 
situations which are candidates the proposition will be true while in others it will 
be false, not merely neither true nor false. (This requires some semantic assump-
tions according to which ¬p being true entails p being false.) The proposition is 
therefore indeterminate, because it is true in some candidate situations and false 
in others. This works in much the same way as the supervaluationist approach to 
vagueness and, of course, in the way BW describe for worlds.
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Finally, suppose we have a case of deep indeterminacy.12 For ease, let’s use a 
quantum mechanical case (granting the required interpretative assumptions). Again, 
there will be many situations in the set of candidates for representing reality which 
say nothing about this quantum system, and hence in which propositions relating to 
it are neither true nor false. But there will also be other sorts of situation. Let’s con-
sider four in particular, which contain certain information about the properties of the 
system. The first,  s1, might, for instance, have a particle spin-up in the x-direction. 
Let this information be captured by a proposition p. Thus, in  s1, p is true. The sec-
ond situation,  s2, is one in which the quantum system has contrary properties, e.g. 
the particle has opposite spin in the same direction. Thus, in  s2, the proposition ¬p is 
true and so, given some semantic assumptions, p is false. So far, nothing differs from 
a normal case of indeterminacy, which can equally be captured by the BW model. 
But here’s the distinctive advantage of situations: not all of the properties of the 
quantum system need to be precise in  s1, which need for example include nothing 
about spin of that particle in the y-direction. Now take two further situations,  s3 and 
 s4. In  s3, some proposition q, corresponding to some value for spin in the y-direc-
tion, is true, and ¬q is true in  s4.13 Because of the Kochen–Specker theorem, there 
is a mathematical constraint that no situation contains determinate truth-values for 
both p and q. But this is not violated by  s1–s4, as we can hold q to be neither true nor 
false in  s1 and  s2. And ¬q will likewise lack a truth-value in  s1 and  s2. Similarly, both 
p and ¬p will fail to have a truth-value in  s3 and  s4. Thus in none of  s1–s4 is there 
conflict with deep indeterminacy. We are not required to give truth-values to any 
pair-wise combination of, one the one hand, p and ¬p and, on the other, q and ¬q.
Let’s recap. We have four situations, and, in each, one of a pair of propositions 
is true (and the other false) while a second pair receives no truth-value. These situ-
ations are the candidate precisifications that give rise to the indeterminacy of the 
world with respect to the propositions. This, in essence, is our way to capture deep 
indeterminacy within a BW-style framework. By using partial things, namely situa-
tions, in the model we can make space for deeply indeterminate propositions.
So far, so good. But there is a sting in the tail. The situations which are candi-
dates precisifications of actuality fundamentally disagree in cases of both garden-
variety and deep indeterminacy. There is a threat that this fundamental disagreement 
will lead to a contradiction if we are not careful. In the Jones case, for instance, there 
are situations in which Jones is F and situations in which Jones is not. If there are 
larger candidate situations containing both of these, and if what is true in a part of 
a situation is true in the whole situation, then the larger candidate situation will be 
contradictory: in it Jones will be F and not F. We therefore need to spell out how the 
fundamental disagreement necessary for indeterminacy can be maintained without 
falling into contradiction.
12 The example we use here is taken from our earlier joint work with Jon Robson  (2017).
13 We are suppressing some details here, as in the quantum mechanical case there’d also be further situa-
tions corresponding to spin in the z-direction. Two pairs suffice for the demonstration, however.
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4.3  Disagreement without contradiction
Not all truths which are in candidate situations can be consistently combined. We 
need to provide a restriction that rules out a situation which is a candidate for actual-
ity from containing a contradiction while maintaining the fundamental disagreement 
in the model. There is a choice to be made about what the restriction is a restriction 
upon. Three possibilities present themselves.
Firstly, the restriction could be a restriction on composition. According to this 
option, some situations compose a further situation only under some restricted cir-
cumstances. This solves the problem by finding an appropriate restriction such that 
there simply is no situation which contains as parts both a situation in which Jones 
is F and a situation in which Jones is not F. There would then be no threat of contra-
diction in any situation. Although situation theory usually operates with unrestricted 
and unique fusion as a mereological principle (at least for actual situations, on which 
more below), there’s no reason in principle why this couldn’t be rejected.
Secondly, the restriction could be a restriction on what counts as a candidate for 
actuality. According to this option, only in restricted circumstances does fusing two 
situations which are candidates for actuality result in a situation which is also a can-
didate for actuality. This solves the problem because, given an appropriate restric-
tion, although the situations in which Jones is F and in which Jones is not F are each 
candidates for actuality, the situation which combines them is not. There is a con-
nection with the previous possibility here, as in contexts without indeterminacy the 
only candidates for actuality will be the actual situations.
Thirdly, the restriction could be a restriction on how truth transfers between situa-
tions related by parthood. In situation theory this is referred to as the question of the 
persistence of propositions across situations. Universal persistence states that when-
ever a proposition is true in a situation which is a part of another, it is also true in the 
larger situation. Situation semanticists are divided about whether or not universal 
persistence should be accepted.14 A restriction on persistence would solve the prob-
lem by finding an appropriate restriction such that propositions about Jones’s having 
or lacking F don’t persist into the fused situation.
Broadly speaking, the choice of what to restrict upon is a choice between a mere-
ological restriction (restricted composition), a modal restriction (restricted actual-
ity) and a semantic restriction (restricted persistence). However, this choice will 
not make a difference to the formal task of providing a model for the account of 
metaphysical indeterminacy we propose. We will choose to take the semantic route 
and restrict which propositions persist from situations to their extensions for ease of 
exposition. We take our solution, however, to be translatable into the mereological 
or modal versions without issue.
14 For instance, Kratzer (1989) keeps hold of universal persistence, but Elbourne (2005, 2013) rejects 
it. One initial reason to reject it comes from universally quantified statements (where they can be true in 
small situations but false in larger ones containing the former).
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4.4  A restriction on persistence
As mentioned above, it is a contentious issue in situation semantics whether propo-
sitions universally persist. We will propose that, in certain contexts, they do not. 
Although we think a precise restriction on persistence might be formalised, so that 
propositions persist unless certain conditions are satisfied, for our purposes here it is 
not necessary to elaborate and defend such a restriction.15 What matters for the argu-
ment is to explain how the failure of universal persistence allows for an adequate 
account of metaphysical indeterminacy.
So, instead of providing a detailed account of restricted persistence we will oper-
ate with a guiding principle in line with the way we introduced truth-value gaps in 
Sect. 4.1 above. There we noted that some propositions can be underdetermined and 
some overdetermined by situations. Our guiding principle will be that propositions 
fail to persist when they are overdetermined, i.e. when some other part of the larger 
situation into which they would persist already says something about the proposi-
tion. This overdetermination can be cashed out in terms of preclusion. A proposition 
is precluded by a situation when the proposition cannot be true with the contents of 
that situation.16
It might be helpful to give a brief example. Imagine that a banana changes from 
being green to being yellow. The banana will be green in some situations at the ear-
lier time and yellow in some situations at the later time. Suppose there is a larger 
situation s which has both an earlier and a later situation as parts. If propositions 
universally persisted, the proposition that the banana is green and the proposition 
that it is yellow would both be true in s. But the idea we’re pursuing says that neither 
proposition persists, because the larger situation s overdetermines the colour of the 
banana. The proposition that the banana is green doesn’t persist from the smaller 
situation at the earlier time into s because s contains a part (viz. a situation concern-
ing the later time) which says something about the proposition that the banana is 
green. Specifically, the later situation precludes the proposition that the banana is 
green. Parallel reasoning applies to the proposition that the banana is yellow. Hence 
neither of these propositions persists into s.17 This should give an indication of how 
the machinery is supposed to work, which we can then deploy to address the current 
problem.
The problem we face is this: to explain how in a case of indeterminacy we get 
disagreement without contradiction. In short, the answer is that there are truth-
value gaps of the overdetermination character when propositions fail to persist in 
15 See Pickup (2016) sect.  2.3 for an earlier discussion of a restriction on persistence. The restriction 
there employed goes via counting of existential situations for the particulars referred to by the proposi-
tion. (An existential situation for some a is a situation in which a exists.) This paper does not rely on that 
account of restricted persistence.
16 Of course, a full theory of preclusion would be necessary to give a precise account of this restricted 
persistence condition. As we have said, we do not intent to furnish such a complete account: this would 
be a different and much longer paper. But see the Appendix to Pickup (2016) for some groundwork.
17 This is clearly just a toy example, and much more would need to be said about it.
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indeterminacy cases. There is disagreement between situations but gaps, rather than 
contradictions, within situations.
Consider the situations containing Jones being F and Jones being not F. The 
fusion of these situations is causing the problem, as if universal persistence were to 
be straightforwardly upheld this situation would have both ‘Jones is F’ and ‘Jones 
is not F’ true in it. Our suggestion is simply that both of these propositions lack 
a truth-value in the fused situation. This is because there is overdetermination of 
propositions about Jones’s F-ness in the fused situation.18
We used situations to explain how the deeply indeterminate quantum mechanical 
case might be dealt with: in  s1 p is true, in  s2 p is false, in  s3 q is true and in  s4 q is 
false without those situations specifying any other truth-values. We can now show 
how contradiction is avoided in larger situations containing some of  s1–s4 as parts. 
In any situation containing both  s1 and  s2 as parts, p lacks a truth-value because p is 
overdetermined (and likewise with q in situations containing  s3 and  s4). The proposi-
tion p is precluded by  s2 and ¬p is precluded by  s1, so neither are true in the larger 
situation containing  s1 and  s2 as parts.
But, and here is the crux, it is also the case that any situation containing  s1 and 
 s3 will lack a truth-value for both p and q. Why is this? It is because  s3 precludes p 
(p cannot be true with  s3’s contents) and  s1 precludes q. What is distinctive about 
this case is that  s3 doesn’t preclude p by p being false in  s3. Rather,  s3 precludes p 
because, given the contents of  s3, p cannot have either truth-value. This is unlike the 
typical cases of metaphysical indeterminacy above, and captures the deep indetermi-
nacy. So, in general any situation containing one of the pair  s1/s2 and one of  s3/s4 will 
not receive a truth-value for either p or q. Thus the deeply indeterminate case is also 
captured: given the Kochen–Specker result, p and q cannot both receive truth-values 
in any situation and our interpretation is able to encode such constraints. In effect, 
what Kochen–Specker tells us is that p and q act as precluders for one another, mak-
ing any situation containing parts in which both receive truth-values overdetermined 
in the relevant sense. Persistence therefore fails in these scenarios.
To summarise: what it means for something to be metaphysically indeterminate 
is for a number of different, incompatible situations to be real candidates for the 
18 Suppose we fuse the minimal situation that Jones is F with the minimal situation that Jones is not F. 
Call this situation s*. From what we have said, it is clear that neither ‘Jones is F’ nor ‘Jones is not F’ will 
be true in s*. Will any proposition be true in s*? Yes: it is true in s* that it has a part in which Jones is F, 
and likewise true that it has a part in which Jones is not F.
 What about the disjunctive proposition ‘Jones is F or Jones is not F’? There is a choice-point here on 
the semantics: it could be true, false or neither true nor false. As it doesn’t affect our main argument, we 
won’t settle this question. Nevertheless it is interesting to note that, if such disjunctions are true in all 
cases like this, our model may be able to uphold excluded middle (though there’s further work to do to 
show this).
 Note, too, that the mereological relations between situations cannot be defined in terms of the mereo-
logical relations between the sets of propositions true in them. The set of propositions true in s* is not a 
fusion of the propositions true in the minimal situations in which Jones is F and not F precisely because 
persistence is not universal. This also has interesting consequences for the identity conditions of situa-
tions, which we cannot go into here.
 Thanks to a reviewer for prompting us to think about this further.
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way the world is. A proposition is (metaphysically) indeterminate when it is true in 
some situation which is a candidate for actuality and false in another such situation. 
There is thus fundamental disagreement between the situations which are candidates 
for actuality. Situations allow unrestricted and unique fusion, so any situations can 
be combined. Furthermore, if two situations are candidates for actuality then their 
fusion is as well. This means there are situations which are candidates for actuality 
containing as parts situations which fundamentally disagree. If we accepted univer-
sal persistence, such situations would cause problems. But we do not: propositions 
persist only under restricted conditions. They fail to persist when overdetermined. 
This overdetermination can be expressed as preclusion: a proposition is overdeter-
mined in a situation when that situation contains a part which precludes the propo-
sition. A proposition is precluded by a situation when it cannot be true with the 
contents of that situation. Therefore, in situations which contain fundamentally disa-
greeing parts there are truth-value gaps concerning the propositions which are over-
determined by those fundamentally disagreeing parts. In typical cases of metaphysi-
cal indeterminacy, the propositions are precluded by virtue of being true in some 
part of the larger situation and false in some other part of that situation. By ruling 
out persistence, we avoid contradiction in these examples. Cases of deep indetermi-
nacy are special cases of overdetermination where constraints are placed on which 
pairs of propositions can be true together. In these cases, the propositions are pre-
cluded by virtue of being true in some part of the larger situation and unable to have 
a truth-value in some other part of that situation. Each of the pair then lacks a truth-
value in combined situations. So there are no situations in which either a contradic-
tion is true or the constraints imposed by deep indeterminacy are violated.
Thus we can safely hold that there is the fundamental disagreement required 
between candidates for actuality without either falling into contradiction or failing to 
capture deep indeterminacy.
4.5  Application to other quantum cases
In our discussion, we have so far focused on a particular quantum mechanical case 
where the Kochen–Specker theorem tells us that members of certain pairs of propo-
sitions cannot both receive definite truth-values.19 This is the issue of deep indeter-
minacy, and the example is one used in the literature to prosecute the BW model. 
In a recent paper, however, Calosi and Wilson have expanded the range of quantum 
mechanical cases that have been considered as instances of metaphysical indetermi-
nacy. Specifically, the example we have discussed is a case of ‘incompatible observ-
ables’ in their terminology, and the further examples are those of superposition and 
entanglement (see Calosi and Wilson 2018, sect.  2.2). In this section, therefore, 
we wish to briefly show that the same mechanism we have used for the incompat-
ible observables case can be applied to these other two examples where, arguably, 
quantum theory might warrant metaphysical indeterminacy. (We do so while still 
19 This section was prompted by a request from a reviewer, to whom we are grateful.
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remaining agnostic on the value of quantum theory as a motivation for metaphysical 
indeterminacy as outlined in our Sect. 3.)
4.5.1  Superposition
The classic example of superposition is Schrödinger’s unfortunate cat. The cat is put 
in a sealed box that has probabilistic mechanism (typically decay of a radioactive 
substance) which will release deadly gas if triggered. The system can be set up so 
that at some particular time the probability of the cat being alive and probability of 
the cat being dead are equal. The quantum mechanical upshot is that the cat is in a 
superposition of alive and dead. This superposition, given the interpretative assump-
tions we’ve been granting, is plausibly a related but distinct example of metaphysi-
cal indeterminacy: it seems metaphysically indeterminate whether the cat is alive or 
dead.
Our model can deal with this case in a natural way. Consider the following three 
situations, each of which is a candidate for actuality:  s1, a situation in which the cat 
is alive,  s2, a situation in which the cat is dead, and  s3, the fusion of  s1 and  s2. In  s1, it 
is true that the cat is alive and false that it is dead. In  s2 it is true that the cat is dead 
and false that it is alive. So, what status do these propositions have? According to 
our definition they are indeterminate, because there is a situation which is a candi-
date for actuality in which they are true and another situation which is a candidate 
for actuality in which they are false.
What is the case in  s3? It seems  s3 is overdetermined with respect to the cat’s 
mortality, as parts of  s3 disagree about whether the cat is alive. Specifically,  s2 pre-
cludes the proposition that the cat is alive and  s1 precludes the proposition that the 
cat is dead. So, following our argument above, the proposition that the cat is alive is 
neither true nor false in  s3 (as is the proposition that the cat is dead).
The indeterminacy involved in superposition is therefore dealt with. In fact, it 
operates in just the same way as a garden-variety case of metaphysical indetermi-
nacy, like the example of Jones’s being F.
4.5.2  Entanglement
The phenomenon of quantum entanglement is more complicated on our picture. 
Entanglement is a feature exhibited by quantum systems when a composite system 
has definite values while the components of the system do not. For instance, con-
sider two particles each in a superposition of two different properties (spin-up and 
spin-down in some direction, say). These particles can be prepared such that there 
is a perfect anti-correlation between their properties: if the first is measured and has 
one property, the other will always and immediately have the contrary property. If 
one is spin-up in the appropriate direction, the other is spin-down. This is so even 
though, because of the superposition, it is indeterminate which properties the par-
ticles have before measurement. More generally, the system composed of the two 
particles is definitely one in which both properties are had, but it isn’t determinate 
which particle has which property. The composite system is determinate in a way 
that the parts of the system are not.
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Entanglement is a phenomenon of significant philosophical interest. It chal-
lenges background assumptions used in forming physical theories, assumptions such 
as separability (the idea that the state of a whole is summed from the state of its 
parts) and locality (the denial of action at a distance). From our point of view, what 
is relevant is the way that entanglement, once again given interpretative assump-
tions, gives a pattern of determinacy and indeterminacy which is distinct from both 
cases we have considered so far. In an interesting way, entanglement seems to be the 
inverse of deep indeterminacy. Deep indeterminacy is a constraint which prevents 
certain things being determinate together. Entanglement is a phenomenon by which 
two things must become determinate together.
To model this, we start as usual with some situations which are candidates for 
actuality. Take  s1 and  s2 to be the situations in which the first particle has spin-up 
and spin-down respectively in some direction. The particle is in a superposition of 
spin-up and spin-down, so as in the previous section the situation  s3 which fuses  s1 
and  s2 will be one into which the relevant propositions don’t persist. It is indetermi-
nate whether the particle is spin-up or spin-down. The same is true of the second 
particle with corresponding situations  s4–s6. What is special about entanglement is 
that the fusion of the superposed states produces some determinacy. Let  s7 be the 
fusion of  s3 and  s6. Although it is neither truth nor false in  s3 and  s6 that the particle 
in the situation is spin-up or spin-down, it is true in  s7 that one of the two particles is 
spin-up and the other is spin-down. Because this is true in  s7, it is true in a candidate 
for actuality (as  s7 is such a situation). It is false in no situation which is a candidate 
for actuality. Thus it is determinately true that one particle is spin-up and the other 
spin-down. However, for each particle it is indeterminate what spin it has.20
Our approach, therefore, allows us to capture the metaphysical indeterminacy 
(and determinacy) involved in entanglement by once more attending to what is the 
case in different situations which are all candidates for actuality. We have not, it 
must be admitted, explained why there is determinacy in  s7 which is not present in 
any sub-situation. But we don’t take this to be the task, just as we haven’t explained 
why the pairs of propositions in a deeply indeterminate case preclude definite values 
for one another. We are simply providing a consistent model for metaphysical inde-
terminacy which can accurately capture all the relevant claims.
(To be speculative for a moment: the holism seemingly involved in entanglement 
might make us reflect on which situations ought to be considered fundamental. It 
is tacitly assumed that smaller situations are more primitive, but there is nothing in 
20 In fn 18 we mentioned that there is a decision to be made in the semantics about the truth-value of a 
disjunction in a situation where both disjuncts are indeterminate through overdetermination. This choice 
will have an interesting connection to the explanation of the entanglement case. Suppose such disjunc-
tions are true; the disjunction ‘first particle spin-up or spin-down’ will be true in  s3 (and  s7). The disjunc-
tion ‘second particle spin-up or spin-down’ will be true in  s6 (and  s7). In  s7, where both disjunctions are 
true, the following true disjunction also emerges: ‘(first particle spin-up and second particle spin-down) 
or (first particle spin-down and second particle spin-up)’. What is ruled out is both particles having the 
same spin, i.e. the disjunction ‘(first particle spin-up and second particle spin-up) or (first particle spin-
down and second particle spin-down)’. The phenomenon of entanglement can then be expressed as the 
truth of one disjunction and the falsity of the other in  s7.
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the use of situations which requires this to be the case. A mereology of situations 
needn’t take parts to be prior to wholes. Working out this thought, however, would 
take us far beyond the scope of this paper.)
This concludes our presentation of our model and interpretation. In what follows, 
we wish to evaluate the proposal. In particular, we will do so by looking at a non-
exhaustive group of similar alternatives and showing a consequence our approach. 
In so doing, we also hope to clarify the view we’ve outlined.
5  Evaluation
We have offered a model which uses the basic insight of the Barnes–Williams 
account of metaphysical indeterminacy with some vital adjustments. These adjust-
ments have some interesting effects. We’ll briefly highlight one of these.
In our model, candidates for actuality can contain truth-value gaps. Thus the pic-
ture we present doesn’t uphold classical logic and, in particular, rejects bivalence 
(which was a supposed virtue claimed by the BW model).21 It’s a matter of debate 
whether we ought to uphold bivalence in contexts of metaphysical indeterminacy, 
but it is worth pointing out its denial already appears by our use of (typically par-
tial) situations and our choice to take some propositions to be neither true nor false 
in some situations. Bivalence is not a feature well-suited to situation theory as we 
construe it.
Nevertheless, the model we provide of metaphysical indeterminacy involves a 
more dramatic rejection of classical logic than that implied just by use of situations. 
We have truth-value gaps even in candidate situations which are intuitively ‘world-
sized’. Further, we take it that a proposition can be neither true nor false in a situ-
ation even when that proposition is true or false in a part of that situation. This is 
precisely what happens in cases of metaphysical indeterminacy. On our picture, situ-
ations can fail to return a truth-value for a proposition both by underdetermining it 
(e.g. by not containing the relevant individuals) but also by overdetermining it (e.g. 
by containing parts which disagree about how things are). This leads to situations 
where propositions are neither true nor false even though all the relevant entities are 
in those situations. Some may find this feature off-putting; here we can only make it 
explicit.22
If this feature is considered to be off-putting, this might motivate a search for 
alternatives. We do not claim that ours is the only way in which one could adapt 
the Barnes–Williams model to handle deep indeterminacy. But it is also worth 
indicating some challenges for a few of the alternatives which immediately present 
themselves.23
21 It may also reject excluded middle, depending on the semantics. See fn 18.
22 Pickup (2016) adds to a cumulative case for taking such a view seriously.
23 We cannot consider all alternatives, but there are a few possible views we want to explicitly note we 
won’t be discussing. The first is to use our structure but retain universal persistence, ending up with 
truth-value gluts rather than truth-value gaps. The second is to use the BW model and allow physically 
impossible but metaphysically possible worlds to be candidate precisifications.
1 3
Synthese 
5.1  Persistence as worldly
One initially attractive variant on our view can be fairly quickly dealt with. This 
variant suggests a particular way to constrain persistence. It restricts persistence to 
cases where the relevant situations are both parts of the same world. To be explicit: 
on this view a proposition which is true in a situation is true in all extensions of that 
situation which are part of the same world.
It is worth first seeing why this is supposed to help, before showing why it 
doesn’t. The garden-variety cases of metaphysical indeterminacy, like Jones’s being 
or not being F, threatened to lead to contradiction on our model if we allowed uni-
versal persistence, because there would be situations which are candidates for actu-
ality which contained parts maintaining both that Jones is F and that Jones is not 
F. The condition that propositions only persist when the situations related by part-
hood are world-mates would deal with this issue. For the situations in which Jones 
is F and the situations in which Jones is not F are plausibly not jointly parts of any 
world (though they are jointly parts of some trans-world situations). So the condi-
tion would avoid the risk of contradiction in garden-variety cases of metaphysical 
indeterminacy.24
Unfortunately, though, this proposal has no such success in cases of deep inde-
terminacy. Deep indeterminacy tells us that there are some scenarios where pairs of 
propositions cannot both be given truth-values even when they are not contradictory. 
In the quantum–mechanical case we’ve discussed, p and q cannot both get truth-
values in any situation which is a candidate for actuality. But it seems the situation 
 s1 in which p is true and the situation  s3 in which q is true can both be part of the 
same world (if not, we need to be told why). Therefore, according to the condition 
provided, situations containing both  s1 and  s3 as parts will have p and q both persist 
into them. This is precisely the problem with BW’s model that we started with: real-
ity cannot be completely precisified into world-sized candidates for actuality.
A condition on persistence which allows persistence whenever situations are 
world-mates collapses into the original BW model. It is worlds, not situations, which 
are doing the work on such a view. It is worth remembering that we are framing the 
issue in terms of the persistence of propositions, rather than in terms of composi-
tion or candidacy for actuality. But the point remains the same in these other terms. 
If we restrict composition so that situations only compose a further situation when 
 Without going into detail, we find it hard with the first view to avoid falling into dialetheism and the 
second takes physically impossible worlds as candidates for actuality, which pushes against the idea that 
actuality implies physical possibility.
 The proposals of Torza (2017) is more promising, though it departs from BW in a more radical way 
than we do. Wilson (2013, 2016; Calosi and Wilson 2018) offers a quite different approach which again 
is more promising. But we don’t have space to survey all these alternatives here.
Footnote 23 (continued)
24 This restriction might be best expressed as a restriction on candidacy for actuality: if two situations 
which are candidates for actuality are fused, it is always and only the case that the fusion is a candidate 
for actuality if the component situations are jointly part of some world. As noted in the main text, deep 
indeterminacy shows this restriction too permissive.
 Synthese
1 3
they are world-mates,25 or restrict candidacy for actuality so that situations are only 
candidates for actuality when all their parts are world-mates, we’ll still be left with 
the problem of deep indeterminacy. Therefore, for the solution to work, we need 
persistence (or composition, or candidacy for actuality) to fail even within worlds.
5.2  Imprecise worlds
In his paper criticising the BW model for its failure to capture deep indeterminacy, 
Brad Skow briefly considers a tweak to their model which bears some resemblance 
to our approach. He says:
The orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics is compatible with the 
existence of partial precisifications of reality. But the prospects of using 
this notion to put together a model of metaphysical indeterminacy similar to 
Barnes and Williams’ model are dim. For suppose we keep their framework 
but replace perfectly precise possible worlds with imprecise possible worlds 
(sets of sentences from a language which suffers from semantic indetermi-
nacy). Even when there is no metaphysical indeterminacy, we can expect it 
to happen that several imprecise possible worlds do not determinately misrep-
resent reality. So using imprecise worlds would give multiple actuality even 
when there is no metaphysical indeterminacy.
(Skow 2010, p. 858)
It isn’t completely clear to us how to unpack what Skow means here.26 But he seems 
to identify something like the model we have presented. It is, however, importantly 
distinct. We developed our model from what we called the ‘obvious’ idea that less-
than-complete precisifications are substituted for BW’s complete, precise worlds. 
This idea admits of two readings: an ordinary possible world is maximal, in the 
sense of treating everything, and precise, in the sense that everything that it does 
treat, it treats precisely. A situation is less than maximal, treating some propositions 
but remaining silent about others; there is nothing inherently imprecise about this. 
Our view uses such precise (but incomplete) situations to model indeterminacy. 
Skow here appears to consider the other reading: his imprecise possible worlds are 
maximal (although he is not explicit about this) but imprecise.
We are inclined to agree that imprecise worlds would not save the Barnes–Wil-
liams model, as it would over-generate indeterminacy. If we are using imprecise 
things in the modelling, even a precise reality would appear indeterminate. But, of 
course, that is not what we are doing. We use non-maximal but precise situations to 
model indeterminacy, and give circumstances when fusing precise situations leads to 
25 A specific version of this view follows from one way to set up situation theory. Some situation theo-
rists only allow actual situations to exist. If so, it is only actual situation that can be composed, which are 
trivially world-mates in typical contexts. In this context, where we are considering multiple actualities, 
this situation-theoretic choice would be unwise.
26 In particular, it isn’t clear exactly what sets of sentences from a language suffering from semantic 
indeterminacy has to do with the imprecision of possible worlds.
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truth-value gaps. In cases where there is no metaphysical indeterminacy, there will 
be no gaps in the fusions. Our model therefore doesn’t over-generate indeterminacy. 
So, in effect our proposal is simply that Skow considers the wrong modification: 
don’t use complete but imprecise worlds, use incomplete but precise situations.27
5.3  Primitive indeterminacy of parthood
A final alternative we’ll consider retains much of our model but makes an important 
change. It uses situations, as incomplete precisifications, but takes indeterminacy to 
be a matter of unsettledness about which situations are parts of the actual world. 
This offers a view with more surface resemblance to the original BW model, but 
there are reasons to be wary of it. In the first place, there are significant departures 
from BW once the theory is more closely examined, and secondly, we are worried 
that the phenomenon of deep indeterminacy is not adequately captured.
But we are getting ahead of ourselves. First, the alternative. Return to the exam-
ple above of our quantum system in situations  s1–s4: p is true in  s1, ¬p is true in  s2, 
q is true in  s3 and ¬q is true in  s4. But  s1–s4 don’t give a truth-value for either of the 
propositions from the other pair. There are also situations which have more than one 
of  s1–s4 as parts: these are the situations into which, on our model, the truth-values 
do not persist. On our model, p and q receive no truth-value in these situations.
Recall that we have presented our view using the framing of a semantic restric-
tion on when propositions persist. The alternative we now wish to consider is most 
easily expressed by instead considering a mereological restriction on which situa-
tions are able to compose a further situation. This won’t matter to the formal struc-
ture of the alternative but makes exposition easier.28
In these terms, this alternative states that there is some situation S which is the 
actual world. All of  s1–s4 are candidates for actuality. But it is indeterminate which 
of each pair  s1–s2 and  s3–s4 are parts of S. In other words, it is indeterminate which 
of  s1–s4 compose S. There is thus primitive indeterminacy in the parthood relations 
of reality: in BW’s terms we might say that it is unsettled which of each pair of 
situations is part of the actual world. (BW of course have unsettledness in a dif-
ferent form as primitive in their model, hence the abandonment of reductive ambi-
tions.) The parthood relations are indeterminate but universal persistence need not 
be denied. All of  s1–s4 remain candidates for actuality, but S contains only some 
of them (and it is indeterminate which). The situations which are parts of S are the 
27 Calosi and Wilson (2018) sect. 3.4.2 provides further argument against a partial precisifications view 
of the form that Skow envisages. One worry is about saving classical logic, and we concede our precise 
but incomplete situations don’t do this. The other worry is that the indeterminacy of imprecise worlds 
will need to be explained by some other means, which doesn’t arise for our view for the reason that we 
don’t have imprecise worlds, but precise situations.
28 To be explicit: in terms of restricted persistence, the alternative spelled out below takes which propo-
sitions persist to be itself indeterminate. Some propositions do persist from  s1–s4 to their extensions, it 
is just indeterminate which. Thus either p or ¬p and either q or ¬q persist, though it isn’t determinate 
which. Contrast this with our view, on which none of these persist.
 Synthese
1 3
ones whose propositions are true in S. Because its parts are indeterminate, it is inde-
terminate which propositions are true in S.
Why not accept this alternative? We are concerned that the way that it deals with 
deep indeterminacy is inadequate. Let’s make clear why.
Though this view doesn’t require that the propositions true in each of  s1–s4 are all 
true in S, it does tell us that one from each pair of situations  s1/s2 and  s3/s4 is part of 
S.29 In other words, though it is unsettled whether  s1 or  s2 is part of S (and likewise 
for  s3 and  s4), because the parthood relations are indeterminate, it is determinate that 
either  s1 or  s2 is part of S. Likewise, it is determinate that either  s3 or  s4 is part of S. 
Universal persistence holds in this context, so what is true in a part of a situation is 
true in a whole situation. If it is determinate that either  s1 or  s2 is part of S, then it 
is determinate that either p or ¬p is true in S (though of course it is indeterminate 
which) and it is determinate that q or ¬q is true in S (though indeterminate which). 
The propositions persist, though which propositions is not determinate because 
which situations are parts of S is not determinate.30 Thus in S while it is indetermi-
nate whether p and indeterminate whether q, it is determinate that one of each pair 
is true.
This is already a violation of the spirit of Kochen–Specker and similar ‘no-go’ 
theorems in quantum mechanics: the point of such theorems is that certain pairs of 
propositions cannot be true together. S contains the sort of conjunctions of proposi-
tions that are supposed to be ruled out. But violating the spirit of a constraint is not 
a particularly effective criticism of a model, so we wish to spell out two reasons that 
we prefer our own account to the primitive indeterminacy of parthood model.
In the first place, there are (contested) ways that a violation of the letter of 
Kochen–Specker can be derived. These are contested because they rely on assump-
tions which are themselves controversial in the context of indeterminacy and asso-
ciated non-classical logics. But given that BW wish to preserve classical logic and 
the fact that surface resemblance to the BW might be a motivation for the view, it is 
instructive nevertheless to spell these out.31
The view we’re considering suggests that, in S, it is indeterminate whether p, 
indeterminate whether ¬p, indeterminate whether q and indeterminate whether ¬q. 
It is, however, determinate that (p ∨ ¬p) and determinate that (q ∨ ¬q). If we add the 
very natural claim that determinacy is closed under conjunction, we can conclude 
that it’s determinate that [(p ∨ ¬p) ∧ (q ∨ ¬q)].
To get an explicit violation of Kochen–Specker, though, we need both p and q to 
get determinate truth-values in a situation. One way do so is to first add the assump-
tion that conjunction distributes over disjunction, whereby we get the unwieldy 
claim: it is determinate that [(p ∧ q) ∨  (¬p ∧ q) ∨  (p ∧ ¬q) ∨  (¬p ∧ ¬q)]. If we 
29 Recall that we are ignoring z-direction for simplicity: strictly speaking there would be a third pair of 
situations which gave determinate values for z-direction too.
30 In the terminology of restricting persistence rather than composition the view says it is indeterminate 
which of the pairs  s1/s2 and  s3/s4 is such that what is true in them persists to a situation containing all of 
these as parts. But the truths from one of each pair certainly do persist.
31 Thanks to a referee for pushing us to consider these assumptions.
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further take it that a disjunction being determinate implies that it is determinate that 
a disjunct is true, we arrive at a violation. For we can conclude that either (p ∧ q) or 
(¬p ∧ q) or (p ∧ ¬q) or (¬p ∧ ¬q) is determinately the case. All of these are ruled 
out by Kochen–Specker.
Of course, the assumptions used here can and will be challenged.32 But challeng-
ing them would require giving up classical logic, which BW do not wish to do. Now, 
we give up classical logic, so have no disagreement in principle with this move. It 
is simply worth noting that this alternative is not clearly closer to BW than our pro-
posed model, and that there will be work to do to block a reappearance of the deep 
indeterminacy issue.
The second worry we have with the model also concerns its approach to deep 
indeterminacy, but from a different direction. If S contains one of  s1 or  s2, but not 
both, and one of  s3 and  s4, but not both, then deep indeterminacy is captured using a 
different structure to garden-variety indeterminacy. This is because in garden-variety 
indeterminacy only one of a pair of conflicting situations is part of S (i.e. only  s1 or 
 s2 but not both). While in a deeply indeterminate case conflicting situations are both 
parts of S, because  s1 (and  s2) conflicts with both  s3 and  s4. In itself, this might be 
considered a virtue, as deep indeterminacy is a distinct phenomenon from garden-
variety indeterminacy. But the issue is that the model thereby loses the ability to 
represent the distinctive relationship between the pairs of situations which cannot be 
jointly determinate.
Consider another example, where two independent propositions are both indeter-
minate. Suppose it is indeterminate whether Jones is F and, separately and indepen-
dently, indeterminate whether Smith is G. The model we are considering will treat 
this in precisely the same way as deep indeterminacy. There will be primitive inde-
terminacy in whether the world has as a part a situation in which Jones is F or a situ-
ation in which Jones is not F; likewise with a situation in which Smith is G and one 
in which she isn’t. This means that it will be determinate that [(Jones is F ∨ ¬Jones 
is F) ∧ (Smith is G ∨ ¬Smith is G)]. But, as described in the previous paragraphs, 
avoiding a violation of Kochen–Specker will require rejecting assumptions that war-
rant the move from this to (Jones is F ∧ Smith is G) or (¬Jones is F ∧ Smith is G) or 
…. Thus a case of deep indeterminacy and a case of independent indeterminacy are 
represented the same way, which undermines the expressive power of the account 
we’re currently considering.
In our view, and this is somewhat speculative, it is the fact that the model permits 
the determinate conjunction of [(p ∨ ¬p) ∧ (q ∨ ¬q)] which is the root of the prob-
lem. As much as revising classical logic might prevent this from leading to a direct 
violation of Kochen–Specker, a natural way to capture Kochen–Specker within a 
model of indeterminacy is to rule out precisely such conjunctions in the appropriate 
32 See, in particular, Torza (2017) for a detailed discussion of a way to capture deep indeterminacy 
which denies compositionality.
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cases. So we do not think that, ultimately, this model can adequately capture deep 
indeterminacy.33
To conclude this section, we can express some of these misgivings in the termi-
nology of BW’s One True world. According to the current model there is One True 
actual world, but it is unsettled which situations it has as parts. The parts of the One 
True world, however, are fully determinate, and universal persistence obtains. So, 
whichever parts these may be (and this is indeterminate), the propositions true in 
them are true in the One True world. It is as though reality is poised between alter-
native situations as its parts, but in each of these alternatives we have members from 
both pairs of propositions.
But the point of deep indeterminacy is that it tells us that the sort of things reality 
is poised between are not possible: there can’t be One True world with a truth value 
for p and a truth value for q. Being poised between impossible alternatives, plausi-
bly, is itself impossible. If no alternative is possible, then the One True world isn’t 
possible either.
This leads towards a surprising result. It is not the fact that the BW model uses 
complete precisifications that is the issue; incomplete precisifications (situations) 
can likewise lead to a violation of Kochen–Specker type considerations if we accept 
that there is One True world, even if it is not determinate which it is. For this world, 
if it is precise, will not be able to accurately represent reality. Instead, we need to 
do away with the One True world: it is not that it is indeterminate which is the One 
True world, but that the One True world itself is not determinate. The One True 
world has incompatible parts.
5.4  Evaluation summary
In this section, we have brought out a consequence of the model we have presented 
and compared it with some alternatives. The consequence is that, if there is meta-
physical indeterminacy, candidates for actuality have irreducible truth-value gaps. 
Thus the contenders for reality are not bivalent. This might seem undesirable but 
might be, we think, a consequence of taking metaphysical indeterminacy seriously.
The alternatives to our model we have considered seem to either (1) suffer from 
the same issues with deep indeterminacy that undermine the BW approach we 
started with (and in one case collapse into it) or (2) stipulate indeterminacy when 
there is none (as argued by Skow). This has hopefully made clearer exactly how our 
own model should be understood and given some support for it.
33 It could be suggested that only one of  s1–s4 is a part of S (and it is indeterminate which) (thanks 
to Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra for this suggestion). But this seems difficult to square with claims about 
fixed relative values of variables in quantum mechanical cases (see Torza 2017). It also seems to give up 
the desiderata that there is One True (complete) actual world: such a world would be incomplete.
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6  Conclusion
We have constructed a model of metaphysical indeterminacy that can handle deep 
indeterminacy. After outlining Barnes and Williams’s recent meta-level model of 
metaphysical indeterminacy, we rehearsed arguments that it is incompatible with the 
kind of ‘deep’ indeterminacy that is arguably involved in quantum mechanics, and 
in any case ought to be handled by a model of metaphysical indeterminacy. This 
might raise doubts that a meta-level account can make space for such indeterminacy. 
We believe it can, and so set out to give a reformulation of the Barnes–Williams 
model using incomplete, local situations. We explained the basic ideas behind situ-
ation semantics and showed how a domain of incomplete situations, together with a 
mereology defined on them, can give rise to a variant of the Barnes–Williams model 
that is close to the original but accommodates deep indeterminacy. The core idea 
is that the candidate precisifications are precise but non-maximal: these precisifi-
cations are parts of the world. Indeterminacy is then a matter of something being 
true in some candidate situations and false in others. This leads to incompatibility 
but not, we argue, contradiction. The manoeuvres required to retain incompatibility 
without contradiction give an interesting account. Finally, we evaluated our model to 
show how it is to be understood and how it is preferable to similar alternatives.
Our conclusion is that there is at least one viable meta-level account of meta-
physical indeterminacy which can handle deep indeterminacy.34
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